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Abstract
Epistemic injustice has rapidly become a powerful tool for analysis of otherwise hidden
social harms. Yet empirical research into how resistance to knowing and understanding
can be generated and replicated in social programmes is limited. We have identified a
range of subtle and not-so-subtle inflections of epistemic injustice as they play out in an
intervention for people with chronic depression in receipt of disability benefits. This
article describes the different ‘species’ of epistemic injustice observed and reveals how
these are unintentionally produced at frontline, management, commissioning and policy
levels. Most notably, there remains a privileging of clinical knowledge over other forms
of knowledge, producing a ‘pathocentric epistemic complex’. This, combined with the
failure of different agencies with competing ideologies to adequately understand each
other, and a vicious policy context, added to the injustices already faced by people with
mental health issues, generating multiple harms. This has important implications for a
range of integrated care and welfare interventions – not least by drawing attention to their
unintended potential for replicating epistemic injustice as an institutionalised complex.
Careful evaluation and design of such programmes, applying the philosophical and
epistemic resources illustrated here, can help mitigate this outcome. Further, by raising
awareness of epistemic injustice among programme participants, we can generate episte-
mic structures that secure programme integrity locally, and promote better policy.
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1 Introduction
The concept, epistemic injustice, is at once simple to grasp yet imbued with the potential to
take multiple hidden forms, twisting in response to the diverse contexts in which it often
surfaces silently. The act of treating someone unfairly “in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker
2007: 1), and the distinctions of hermeneutical and testimonial injustice, provide a fruitful
conceptual territory that continues to be explored and developed in theoretical and empirical
realms. The active debate in this relatively young field has expanded on those initial distinc-
tions to include notions around contributory injustice (Dotson 2012: 31–32), pathocentric
epistemic injustice (Kidd and Carel 2019) and institutional epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007;
Anderson 2012; O’Donovan and Madden 2018), maintained by epistemic communities
(McHugh 2017). Some scholars have warned about perpetuating oppression through defining
epistemic injustice in ways that could exclude important contributions to the discussion, and
argue that the concept should be considered open (Dotson 2012; Pohlhaus Jr. 2017). It is
therefore important to try to describe ‘types’ in context, understand their roles, causes and
effects, and recognise how they manifest differently at different points in a system. Our
evaluation of an integrated health and welfare programme in the UK provides a useful
meso-level stage for catching glimpses of emergent forms.
Research on epistemic injustice has carved out a specific niche in relation to illness and
mental illness in particular.
People experiencing mental distress are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustices
as a consequence of deeply embedded social stigma resulting in a priori assumptions of
irrationality and unreliability such that their knowledge is often discounted or
downgraded. (Newbigging and Ridley 2018: 36).
However, much of the literature on epistemic injustice and mental illness tends to focus on the
pathologization and epistemic silencing of patients by health professionals, belying their stated
commitment to person-centred care (Lakeman 2010; Sanati and Kyratsous 2015; Leblanc and
Kinsella 2016; Crichton et al. 2017; Jackson 2017; Kyratsous and Sanati 2017; Scrutton 2017;
Kurs and Grinshpoon 2018; Newbigging and Ridley 2018). Less attention is paid to identity
prejudice between professional groups, or the ways in which the systems and institutions
designed to support mental health can produce epistemic injustices that damage outcomes for
patients in more insidious ways.
…while Fricker’s focus on individual epistemic virtue is important, we also need to
consider what epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems would require. (Anderson
2012: 163).
Consider Fricker’s paradigmatic case of epistemic injustice, the (1975) case of Carmita Wood,
which explores how social understanding is mediated by inter-disciplinary interactions and
professional discourse to arrive at expert judgements (Fricker 2007). Here, Fricker uses an
underlying feminist analysis to shine a spotlight on the injustice that Wood had suffered in
being subjected to unwanted sexual interest by a former boss, and finding herself ashamed and
embarrassed to speak about this subsequently in front of a claims inspector for employment
benefits. Her claim for benefits was denied. Our starting point is the fact that Carmita’s claim
today would in all likelihood be granted on the grounds of her suffering depression without a
need to justify the reasons why (Viola and Moncrieff 2016; Department for Work and
Pensions 2019). Such decisions involve blended domains of knowledge and inter-
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professional relationships between agencies. Our contemporary context reflects this progress
but reveals new hindrances. For example: the widespread adoption of ‘person-centred care’,
especially in mental health, highlights the value of client knowledge.1 But this can still be
undermined by bureaucratic and inter-professional disparity, access to knowledge, and power
relations based on whose knowledge is considered authoritative.
This article focuses on the multiple inflections of epistemic injustice produced by agents
and systems in ‘Working Well’, an integrated mental health and employment programme.
Instead of focusing on the dynamics between professionals and service users, our study
examined the relationships between experts in social care and welfare, mental health profes-
sionals, their managers, commissioners and policymakers, to identify several different forms in
which epistemic injustice played out: 1) prior assumptions combined with experiences on the
programme led to identity prejudice between practitioners; 2) communications software and
bureaucratic processes unfairly filtered out some valuable forms of knowledge in conversa-
tions around clients; 3) ideological and political disagreement led to managers and commis-
sioners failing to understand each other’s positions; and 4) this was underpinned by a vicious
welfare policy that, through the use of sanctions, undermined clients’ trust in the system and
consequently the programme. We argue that these injustices formed a complex that worsened
outcomes for mental health service users who already face injustices based around social
stigma.
Identifying dynamics that participants may already be painfully aware of and describ-
ing these through the somewhat abstract lens of epistemic injustice to create a new layer
of understanding ironically risks generating an epistemic hierarchy. That is not our
intention. This article highlights the multitude of potential injustices operating through-
out the system. An alertness to this may inform future programme design. Our wider
project, the ERC-funded ‘Knowledge for Use’ (K4U), uses philosophical approaches and
social science case studies to develop theory and evidence to fortify social policies. In
social science, the dynamics examined here tend to be analysed without the label of
epistemic injustice. For example, Kaba and Sooriakumaran (2007) describe the shifting
power dynamics in the doctor-patient relationship; and Godwin (2011) questions how
well-placed the trust in clinical (specifically psychiatric) opinion actually is in judicial
and public policy decisions. We present an empirical exploration of how health and
social care integration creates an arena in which new forms of epistemic injustice are
generated. This is done in the spirit of Fricker’s original idea and its salience for decision
makers at the coalface of modern health and welfare systems.
2 Origins of Working Well's Social Epistemology
The two key architects of the UK’s most radical recent mental health and welfare reforms,
Lord Layard and Lord Freud, both reference the intersection of work and wellbeing, albeit with
a difference of emphasis. In Layard’s original proposals, welfare-to-work was a key
component:
1 This article retains the term ‘client’, which was used by the WorkingWell programme. We note that this frames
the individual as a consumer, perhaps belying some of the programme’s more commercial underpinnings. A
more appropriate term might be ‘intended service beneficiary’ and we acknowledge the problems associated with
labelling groups of people.
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For most people with mental problems, activity is an important path to recovery, and
work (where it can be managed) is one of the most therapeutic activities. (Layard 2005:
23).
Conversely, Freud quotes the economist and social reformer, William Beveridge, in elaborat-
ing what he had always intended should become a requirement for receiving support from the
state:
“Most men who have once gained the habit of work would rather work – in ways to
which they are used – than be idle … But getting work … may involve a change of
habits, doing something that is unfamiliar or leaving one’s friends or making a painful
effort of some other kind…” (quoted in Freud 2007: 2).
However, ‘welfare-to-work’ is vulnerable to ideological, commercial or political subversion.
The Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP) ‘workfare’ scheme was criticised for asking
jobseekers to work for free in a high street retailer (Garland 2019: 102). Nevertheless, the link
between work and wellbeing remains a powerful motivator for initiatives that aim to integrate
welfare and mental health services. For Layard and Clark (2014: 13), “where the welfare state
has gone wrong [is it] had assumed all the problems are external” and it has neglected to
address the extent of depression and anxiety that underlies a vast amount of social misery,
including unemployment (Weich and Lewis 1998; WHO and the Calouste Gulbenkian
Foundation 2014; McManus et al. 2016).
Layard and Freud’s analyses led to different perspectives on welfare reform: Layard
preferred a CBT-first model of intervention delivered via a national IAPT (improving access
to psychological therapies) programme:
If our aim is to empower people to control their own lives, psychological treatment has
to be an important option… If unemployment was once the most prominent source of
misery, it has been replaced by mental illness. (Layard 2005: 3 & 9).
While Freud championed a Work-First model with incentives for employment support pro-
viders to prioritise skills gaps in their return-to-sustained-employment programmes:
A key challenge is to bridge the gap between the “work-first” strategies which have
been found to be effective and the shortfall in skills that is evident in the UK economy.
(Freud 2007: 53).
Under the Coalition Government, it was recognised that pursuing both policies in parallel,
rather than in a more integrated way, was not working. The Ministers responsible (Lord Freud
at the DWP and Norman LambMP at the Department of Health) jointly commissioned RAND
Europe, an independent research institute that aims to improve policy, to revisit the evidence
and propose some solutions.2 RAND identified that:
…services were disconnected, often worked in isolation and towards different objec-
tives, and they ‘did not speak the same language’. (Van Stolk et al. 2014: 25).
2 One might query the role of an external corporate consultancy in determining such a significant policy decision.
The concerns outlined by RAND align with broader integration agendas so are unlikely to have been the sole
determinant underpinning the programme. The RAND study happened prior to the inception of Working Well,
so remains something of a ‘black box’. It would be interesting to gain some insight into how ‘paid for’
knowledge is valued and weighed against prior assumptions, and especially in how this influenced the
programme design – but that is beyond the reach of our inquiry.
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IAPT’s CBT therapists had some limited success in moving people with mental health
conditions off benefits, while the Work Programme’s job coaches supported a small number
(<0.16%) of claimants with diagnosed mental health problems into work (ibid.: 19–23).
However, despite their overarching remits to improve wellbeing and employment outcomes,
both services took a narrow focus and essentially failed to acknowledge each other’s role.
The Working Well pilot was designed to provide an integrated, more personalised model
that addressed the vicious cycle of unemployment and mental health issues. The programme
centred on employment support keyworkers, who would connect clients with a range of
services, including quick access to talking therapies. Keyworkers and talking therapists would
work together to support clients into long-term (>12 months) employment. The shared task
was to address barriers to employment for people with common mental health issues, mainly
depression and anxiety. Effective team working would enable clients to become better
equipped to find work, for example, by having more confidence at job interviews or increased
resilience. Keyworkers could be attached to their clients for up to two years, calling on talking
therapists as appropriate, with a further 12 months of support for those who entered employ-
ment so they could succeed in their new role. The epistemic virtues of Greater Manchester’s
Working Well pilot therefore derive from close attention to evidence, local knowledge, and
experience of implementation flaws in existing government policy.
3 Methods and Ethics
Our evaluation of Working Well aimed to uncover the causal relationships that led to effective
joint working, in particular the moderator and mediator variables in both successful and
unsuccessful outcomes. Ethical approval was granted by Durham University on 18th April
2017 and by the London School of Economics and Political Science on 9th August 2017. The
study protocol was agreed with Programme Managers at Greater Manchester Combined
Authority (GMCA) on 28th September 2017. Data collection ran from October 2017 to
May 2018, with a final evaluation report submitted to GMCA in November 2018.
Using a Grounded Theory approach, 14 facilitated discussion, focus group and verification
group meetings were carried out with 13 keyworkers and 10 talking therapists, plus three
subsequent meetings with managers. This approach allowed us to build a rich picture of the
casework and for several themes to emerge, ranging from technical issues such as poor
software or inadequate policies around information sharing, to more nuanced issues around
different agents’ perceptions of each other’s work, and how they reflected on their own work.
The meetings and interviews were recorded, anonymized, and transcribed. Transcripts were
inputted into NVivo (qualitative data analysis software) and coded using Braun and Clarke’s
(2006) method of thematic analysis.
4 Practitioners on the Front Line
To contextualise the epistemic dynamics discussed here, it is useful to understand the
background for the three agents involved on the front line:
Keyworkers (KWs) were the case leads. They were employed through both council-run
and private employment services providers, and were the main contact for the client. KWs
acted variously as a confidante, advocate and/or sign-poster to other services. KWs saw clients
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weekly, often befriending them as well as identifying their support needs and arranging the
appropriate help for them to become ‘employment ready’. They were generally experienced in
a range of job types, with lots of knowledge around employment and welfare, as well as ‘street
knowledge’ about local services and practical solutions to everyday issues. An important
aspect of the keyworker role was their relative autonomy to select and recommend various
options available to clients, one of which was talking therapies. Essentially, they were ‘wise’,
pragmatic, and operated as a kind of ‘hub’ or ‘secure base’.
Talking therapists (TTs) were Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners or High Intensity
CBT therapists, employed by the NHS. Clients were referred to TTs for quick access to CBT,
ostensibly to address specific mental health barriers to employment. TTs were generally
younger and more highly educated than KWs (most had degrees and specific MH qualifica-
tions). They did not lead on cases but were considered a valuable collaborative resource,
working in tandem with KWs and communicating relevant information about the client’s
mental health with a shared aim of preparing them for employment. In theory, the TTs were
designed to function much as an IAPT team, with the same range of skills in delivering NICE-
approved therapies. In practice, they were more effective when they found ways to work
flexibly in these roles, often with complex non-employment related issues.
Clients generally had a long history of unemployment and it became clear that some had
entrenched negative perceptions of the benefits system. Trust in new initiatives was low and
some clients were selective around which information they shared with whom. Much of this
was thought by KWs and TTs to be motivated by a fear of benefits sanctions, which fuelled a
general distrust in the system as a whole.
5 Epistemic Injustice on the Front Line
It is worth prefacing our specific examples with some qualifying remarks: First, all focus group
participants appeared committed to reflecting on these issues and confronting their disagree-
ments in a spirit of honesty, openness and a willingness to resolve misunderstandings, some of
which were addressed directly through changed work practices. Second, although the problem
of clinical knowledge being unfairly privileged over other forms of knowledge exists else-
where, TTs’ knowledge was also highly valued by clients and KWs alike. It is not our
intention to disparage clinical knowledge but instead to recognise its value within a profes-
sional community that accounts for all forms of knowledge.
1) Keyworkers’ misplaced humility
KWs routinely deferred to TTs’ decisions. This was rationalised through numerous KW
comments along the lines of ‘they’re the experts…’ or ‘we don’t know anything about mental
health’. But KWs were experts in their clients’ wellbeing and were best placed, by design, to
make joint decisions with clients about which services they accessed. KWs’ focus on formal
clinical training they themselves lacked was overemphasised and detracted from their status as
case leads, with TTs serving an ancillary role.
For example, on the tangible issue of making a client referral to the Talking Therapies team,
only to have the referral returned as “not appropriate”, often without any reasons given, KWs
felt disinclined to challenge TTs even when it was clear that their client had been set back by
this decision. The injustice was compounded and reinforced by managers, who felt that the
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solution was for TTs to train KWs in making ‘better’ referrals. Within the safety of a KW-only
focus group, it became clearer why this humility was misplaced and, for some KWs, a
resentment lay behind their apparent humility. First, KWs began to question their clients more
closely if they had spoken with TTs by telephone or at assessment and been rejected. It
emerged that some clients were more willing to open up about mental health issues to KWs
and wanted to talk to their KW about these issues rather than to some as-yet unknown
individual. Second, where KWs had made a considered judgment that their client would
benefit from talking therapy, based on better knowledge of the client’s circumstances and a
view that they were ready to be challenged within the context of some focused therapeutic
work, KWs were properly fulfilling their remit to their clients to advocate and access that
support on their behalf.
This ‘self-directed’ identity prejudice might originate from a pre-existing bias held by KWs:
1) Formal qualifications and clinical knowledge are commonly prioritised in other health-
related contexts, for example, in the relationships between doctors and nurses, nurses and
healthcare assistants, or critically, between healthcare assistants and patients, a relationship that
is routinely silenced by hospital systems (Morey and Steven 2019). 2) Psychological services
have historically been difficult to access in the UK,3 contributing to a perception that such
knowledge has rarity value compared to other public services. 3) This is emphasised by the
highly visible apparatus that surrounds talking therapy services, including qualifications,
clinical supervision, strict guidelines and policies, and specialist terminology (which perhaps
became more overt when KWs joined the programme).
There is also evidence that KWs’ self-directed identity prejudice developed as a response to
the particular joint-working environment created by Working Well: 1) The workshops –
training KWs in referral criteria and basic psychological assessment – established the clinical
process as being the ‘correct’ and only referral approach, and their didactic element skewed the
dynamic between TTs and KWs. 2) When we raised the prospect of KWs feeling diminished
in their knowledge, TTs showed some understanding but also some defensiveness, with one
commenting ‘but we are the experts’. Although some debate is to be expected, that attitude
betrayed a sense of knowledge dominance even if joint-working was pursued in good faith.
KW attitudes were not observed prior to commencing the programme but our findings in
this study indicate their self-directed identity prejudice was based on some pre-existing bias
exacerbated and compounded by their interactions with TTs.
2) Smothering and silencing of the ‘expert’ keyworker
Even the IT systems used in Working Well sometimes ‘made decisions’ about clients
based on automated responses that overrode the detailed knowledge held by KWs. For
instance, a client was ‘exited’ for non-attendance because the system’s calendar appoint-
ment schedule could not be changed and so it mistakenly assumed the client did not
attend. In itself, this is a straightforward technical error but by stifling certain vital
information, including qualitative details of the kind KWs would often garner, the
software silenced conversations between KWs and their clients. Ironically, given the
integrated rationale for the programme, to enable different disciplines to ‘speak the same
language’, the fact that separate databases used by KWs and TTs didn’t communicate
3 The existence of IAPTs itself highlights that professional psychological services are ordinarily difficult to
access, perhaps because they involve specialist and privileged forms of knowledge.
Integrated Care Systems as an Arena for the Emergence of New Forms of...
effectively further contributed to a knowledge imbalance.4 In many ways the most
critical aspects of expertise were held implicitly, often in the working alliance between
KWs and clients. This was systematically smothered by reliance instead upon crude
symptom scores from clinical tools designed for TTs. For example, the standard clinical
referral tools (PHQ-7/GAD-9) do not capture the detailed social circumstances clients
discussed with KWs that might usefully inform TTs about complex problems or suitable
joined-up approaches.
Similarly, many clients struggled with drug and alcohol issues, as well as with depression
and anxiety. TTs were uncomfortable accepting such clients into therapy without reference to
their own referral and assessment criteria. The overall effect was of a clinical ‘veil’ being
drawn over KW/client relationships and all its rich potential insights. While this gave TTs a
form of information-based dominance in their three-way partnership, it deprived them of
access to more intimate forms of knowledge. Such instances spoke of epistemic injustices as
wasted opportunities for greater engagement across more clients, more creative ways of joint
working, and the loss of what might have been shared experiences of learning to support each
other in helping clients. Compounding the issue, KWs were disallowed from sharing their
concerns or expanding on details with TTs due to the strict NHS-inherited confidentiality
policies in place to safeguard clients.
6 Epistemic Injustice among Managers and Commissioners
We also interviewed managers and commissioners, in the expectation of obtaining additional
perspectives and some explanations for why aspects of the programme functioned as they did
(or not) from the people directly responsible for making those decisions. Most of the managers
had been involved with Working Well from the start and the commissioners had been part of
the original design team. Yet it was among these respective leadership roles that we encoun-
tered something unexpected, namely, a level of epistemic violence (Dotson 2011) that
appeared to have soured working relationships in the regular performance meetings to the
extent that communication had clearly broken down. Again, it helps to contextualise what we
identify as epistemic violence by explaining the positions and roles of the main agents.
Managers were responsible for delivering the Working Well service. Two provider
organisations employed the KW teams; one local authority owned and run, and the other a
commercial employment support provider. These managers had various professional back-
grounds, including delivery of NHS-funded services and integrated care programmes, and
provided direct supervision for KWs and team leads. The talking therapies team was employed
by a large mental health NHS Foundation Trust and their managers were themselves senior
talking therapists with clinical backgrounds, directly involved in clinical supervision as well as
performance management.
Commissioners had lead strategic roles for employment and skills across GMCA. They
worked closely with public health and mental health commissioners, and reported to a Local
Authority Chief Executive. As well as their formal role in steering performance, the commis-
sioners had a hands-on role in facilitating the way that Working Well connected to the wider
4 Difficulties between NHS and local authority providers speaking the same language have been noted in other
integrated contexts. For example, Keith Willett, NHS Director for Acute Care observes: “NHS staff and local
authority staff don’t understand each other, don’t trust each other and don’t want to share data” (Leach 2017).
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system of health and social care services. In many ways, the “integrated” aspect of the
programme was dependent on a wide set of relationships and networks these commissioners
facilitated.
We do not think we are overstating the breakdown in communication between managers
and commissioners by using the term ‘epistemic violence’, defined as…
…a failure of an audience to communicatively reciprocate, either intentionally or
unintentionally, in linguistic exchanges owing to pernicious ignorance. (Dotson 2011:
250).
There were two lines of communication difficulty, which all interviewees acknowledged,
though each from their own perspectives. First, NHS managers and the commercial provider
managers spoke a ‘different language’, resulting in what appeared as ‘identity prejudice’.
Animosity on the part of NHS managers may be a reasonable response to the sense of creeping
privatisation that has been a concern over recent years. Animosity on the part of the commer-
cial provider’s managers is likely to be linked with frustration at the perceived inertia and
inefficiencies of public services. However, we were surprised by the vehemence with which
the opposing views were held. Both the commissioners and the managers from the council-run
provider found themselves in the middle of continual disagreement between the NHS and
commercial managers.
Second, notwithstanding the purpose of Working Well’s integrated design to pre-empt silo
working and to foster a sense of shared endeavour, it was clear that the NHS managers were
overly focused on clinical outcomes rather than on employment and skills outcomes. The
commissioners noted that it might have been better if we had been present during their
performance meetings, so that the kind of reflection that had been observed among KWs
and TTs might have been possible at manager and commissioner level.
One specific example – the commercial provider investing in their own in-house counsellor
part-way through the delivery of the programme – captures the essence of these non-
collaborative socio-epistemic practices of mutual ‘silencing’. We set out the perspectives
separately, hopefully doing justice to each.
1. The commercial provider’s justification for commissioning their own in-house counsel-
lor was: a) some GP referrers were requesting counselling for their clients (e.g. where
bereavement was part of the picture of ongoing depression and barriers to employment);
b) the Talking Therapies team only offered CBT despite the ‘menu’ of NICE-
recommended options that was originally intended to be available5; c) it was increasingly
clear that the NHS managers had no intention to enable this provision; and d) providing
this offer in-house was shown to reduce waiting times and improve referral take-up, and
was expected to improve eventual employment outcomes.
2. NHS managers disputed the need for a counselling option, claiming that a) their own
team could offer the appropriate help for clients, as demonstrated by the excellent
recovery rates they were achieving; b) the best predictor for success was not the type of
therapy on offer but the aptitude or match between client and TT, whose skills were not in
question; and c) the counsellor employed by the private provider was not properly trained
5 The service specification originally included couple therapists, brief psychodynamic and IPT therapists, and
counsellors, all of which NICE recommends for depression. However, the local mental health Trust was unable
to recruit these other disciplines to its Working Well TT team.
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to deliver evidence-based therapy (NHS TTs had attended some of that counsellor’s
workshops). This was considered to be offering counselling ‘on the cheap’, thereby
short-changing Working Well clients. One NHS manager commented: ‘you have to know
what you are dealing with and what you are doing… this is a dis-enfranchised group; we
believe they deserve the best’ (defined by NICE as evidence-based CBT).
3. Commissioners and managers from the council-run provider could see both sides in this
argument. They defended the commercial provider against the accusation from the NHS
managers that ‘you are trying to prove you can deliver Working Well on your own
without the need for evidence-based mental health expertise because you want to win
more contracts and make more profits for your shareholders’. Personalisation was a core
principle of Working Well, so offering more options was deemed a legitimate way of
enhancing the potential benefits of the programme. Doing this ahead of scaling up
Working Well, even if this also gained the provider a competitive advantage, was
considered reasonable. Equally, the commissioners were perfectly happy that the NHS
managers had recruited a team of CBT-based TTs, given that NICE guidance recom-
mended CBT across a wide range of common mental health disorders. Commissioners
knew that the NHS managers had been unable to source any multi-skilled candidates
locally but it was feasible for the TTs to develop additional skills as the team evolved.
Further, the TT team were providing a high quality, reliable, safe, effective and flexible
service.
Investing their own money in a resource that enabled them to provide a more effective service
improved the commercial provider’s chances of being recommissioned. Claiming there was a
GP demand for clients to access more diverse forms of counselling helped legitimise this
strategy but also raises the possibility that gaps in the programme could have been
misrepresented for commercial gain. That said, in our study, TTs spoke of some clients
struggling with bereavement and other complex social problems that may have benefited from
less directive approaches, such as counselling. The question of whether the GP demand was
significant is important but remains unanswered. Whether genuine or not, deploying protected
(client) data and appeals to authority (GPs) betrays a strategic use of the epistemic terrain.
Moreover, the claim implies that the programme itself fails to provide adequate hermeneutic
tools to help all clients make sense of their issues. By proposing to broaden this offer and
taking on the investment risk, these actions raised difficult questions around the joint commis-
sioning of public and private organisations.
This position, employing an in-house counsellor, could not be adequately reconciled into
the shared plan already agreed with the NHS and council-run providers, and the problem of
public and private organisations ‘speaking different languages’ remained at the mid- and
higher levels. The NHS has been described as a ‘socialist island in a capitalist sea’ (Powell
1997: 187) – an important ideological discrepancy that gave rise to mutual silencing and wilful
resistance to knowing on both sides of the debate. The competition between NHS and private
providers, not just to be recommissioned here but also to establish power in a developing
integrated landscape, caused rifts that underlined a vicious element between providers that
went beyond ideological differences. In programme terms, it poisoned the joint working
relationship at management levels, as illustrated by some of the NHS managers’ comments.
In commissioning terms, it detracted from the integration focus. These are more intractable
problems compared with the pragmatic solutions found by the frontline workers, highlighting
the contrasting inflections of epistemic injustice that emerge at different points in a system.
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When the contracts were decided for the next phase of scaling up, the two KW provider
organisations won the bid and the talking therapies team was disbanded and redeployed elsewhere.
TheWorkingWell Board decided that it did not need dedicatedmental health input. In this instance,
the clinicians lost out, contrasting with the position at the front line and revealing a tension that
both privileges and de-privileges the clinical position in relation to other professional domains at
different layers in the system. We were not given access to Board-level decisions but attended the
Board meeting that discussed our report and were informed of their decision at that meeting. The
reason stated was that funding for the pilot stage had been a one-off combination of Cabinet Office
and European Social Fund monies. That said, in scaling up and continuing with Working Well
beyond the pilot, decisions had been taken locally as to how andwhat would be funded. Aswewere
not party to those discussions our comments here must be considered speculative, although there is
no obvious connection between the Board’s decision and our evaluation report. It was noteworthy
however, that the Mental Health Commissioner was not present at the Board meeting, which we
took to be symptomatic of a failure, not of the pilot or its providers, but of Greater Manchester’s
commitment to joined-up commissioning at a strategic level. In concrete terms, local budgets for
employment and skills, and for mental health remained separate. The existence of separate budgets
with separate commissioners does not preclude joint commissioning and, indeed, learning from the
pilot may well involve this in a later iteration of Working Well, as the commissioners themselves
expressed to us. However, without reform at a more strategic level, silos will still operate in
commissioning decisions.
7 Species of Emergent Epistemic Injustice Observed in Working Well
In her call for the construction of virtuous social systems, Anderson sees integration as a vital
structural organising principle:
If group segregation is the structural ground of … epistemic injustice … then group
integration is a structural remedy—a virtue of epistemic institutions … Shared inquiry
also tends to produce a shared reality, which can help overcome hermeneutical injustice
and its attendant testimonial injustices. (Anderson 2012: 171).
Our elaboration of emergent species of epistemic injustice, generated by structural features of a
system or institution, appears both to confirmAnderson’s assertion at one level, while disconfirming
it at another. Among frontline practitioners there were clear disparities of status in terms of
knowledge and value given to expertise. This happens in other professional contexts but inWorking
Well, all practitioners faced the weight and depth of their clients’ complex problems (including in
some cases, problems caused by thewelfare system itself). The disparities we observed increased the
risk of programme drift, towards solving mental health issues rather than taking a collaborative
approach to achieve employment outcomes.One could see this as reflecting an organic identification
of priorities, not least since the employment intervention was framed as being partly oriented
towards assisting with mental health issues. But the underpinning mid-range theory was to break
the cycle of mental health issues and unemployment. While the programme viewed both issues as
being inextricably linked, its tangible aim, expressed as a target, was to help its clients into good
quality long-term employment and keyworkers, rather than clinicians, were the first port of call.
It could be argued that by prioritising an employment target as an outcome (and which the cost-
benefit analysis for Working Well depended upon), this simply replaces one epistemic hierarchy
with another. Likewise, to paraphrase Goodhart’s Law –when a measure becomes a target it ceases
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to be a goodmeasure – it could also be the case that epistemic injustice operated at other levels of the
programme, and in other ways, than those we were able to observe. What we can say is that a
pathocentric epistemic complex emerged at this front line level in spite of the design features that
were intended to mitigate against this: namely, that the stated offer to clients emphasised voluntary
participation with the aim of employment as an outcome, and the shared target across the providers
also gave them equal responsibility for delivering employment outcomes.
It should also be recognised that, alongside its targets at programme level, a personalised
approach was designed for each client to track subjective wellbeing and personalised client-
centred goals. These were operationalised through use of an idiographic tool that allowed each
client to define their own recovery goals in their own words. Given the heterogeneity of clients’
needs and circumstances,WorkingWell’s design allowed flexibility in prioritising employment and/
or MH outcomes as appropriate, with space for KWs, TTs and clients to discuss and agree which
specific needs should be met first, en route to achieving that client’s goal.
We have indicated several structural and organisational issues that tended to reinforce the
knowledge asymmetries (Carel and Kidd 2017: 336) between KWs and TTs, and entrench the
privileging of clinical expertise over other knowledges. These were further crystallised by
programme-specific elements, which filtered out the more nuanced experiences of both KWs and
clients, supressing non-clinical voices and instituting a language for talking about mental illness that
gave a hermeneutical advantage to the clinicians. But is this so bad? TTs were employed after all as
highly-qualified specialists. Conversely, KWswere employed on the basis of their experience; some
having beenwelfare recipients, some having experienced their ownmental health difficulties, and all
having ‘street knowledge’ of local challenges and resources. Both brought valuable epistemic
resources into the programme. That TTs and KWs could be categorised by these unequal forms
of knowledge, inevitably they would feel valued differently, and this would naturally be reflected in
their routine inter-disciplinary team dynamics.
While the value of accessing different types of expertise in integrated care might vary for
clients at different times, those in advocacy roles occupy a critical area for promoting epistemic
and consequently social justice by securing their client’s entitlement (Newbigging and Ridley
2018). By habitually deprecating their lack of ‘expert’ knowledge, KWs diminished their
intended advocacy role. Instead, they deferred to the TT’s ‘assessment’, when their actual
request on behalf of their client, appropriately, had been to start a course of one-to-one therapy,
not for an assessment. We do not wish to claim a special status for these solely based around
identity prejudice, but by drawing attention to what is being protected, namely, defensive ways
of working, we hope to shed new light on addressing this.
A culture of protecting professional and organisational identities is one of the most
prominent barriers to new ways of working, especially where established skills and
roles are reconfigured. Other barriers include overestimating the capacity of individual
roles to deliver integrated care, difficulties in making these roles sustainable over time,
and poor accountability and oversight of staff in roles that do not fit into established
structures. (Gilburt 2016: 3).
Due to the sheer inertia of the doxa depression-as-disability among the client group, that was
way beyond the resources of any individual practitioner or client to be able to shift, we believe
KWs and TTs began to see increasingly that they needed to integrate better collectively.
Arguably, participation in our evaluation, as a shared inquiry on equal terms, generated what
Anderson (2012: 171) refers to as a ‘shared reality’, which helped both the KWs and TTs to re-
balance their team dynamic. In Aristotelian terms, there began to be a greater appreciation for
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phronesis, or ‘practical wisdom’, as practised skilfully by KWs in engaging and supporting
their clients. Likewise, a more realistic sense of the limitations of formal learning, in a context
where considerable flexibility and adaptability was needed, began to emerge. This might be
characterised as integrating episteme with phronesis. In some cases, pairs of KWs and TTs
simply invented for themselves new ways of joint working with clients. More generally it was
clearer to them all that certain moments of emotional availability with clients could fall to each
of them, and that sometimes this required extra time and space to support. In other words, good
inter-disciplinary relationships evolved to replace protocol-led ways of working.
At the level of managers and commissioners there was a different story: epistemic violence
got worse, until one group was eliminated. We were not present during performance meetings
with managers and commissioners so we cannot really know why this forum for shared inquiry
led towards a vicious rather than a virtuous outcome. However, we speculate that a combina-
tion of different ideological positions and an inherent competition between the NHS and the
commercial provider played a role in the animosity that emerged between them.
There was also a vicious structural element in Working Well at the welfare policy level (Battaly
2013, 2017). A vicious policymay be a structural organising feature of an integrated programme that
promotes vicious actions, attitudes or states of affairs among its participants (Kidd and Carel 2019).
Time and again we heard about practitioners’ efforts being undermined by benefits sanctions, and a
fragile sense of trust in the whole system once again being shattered. While all participants were
aware of the impacts of austerity onWorkingWell clients, it was psychological therapists, and their
clinician NHS managers as regulated professionals, who were most acutely aware of the unethical
(vicious) implications of benefits sanctions (see Consensus Statement on Welfare Sanctions 2019).
If Working Well meant what it said, then the work involved for all participants on the programme
(clients, practitioners, managers, commissioners) needed to be ‘good work’. Good work is not to be
found at the sharp end of the threat of benefit sanctions.
In January 2020, a parliamentary question was raised regarding links between mental health
and benefits sanctions. The DWP minister responded that “no assessment had been made” of
such links and mentioned no future plans to do so (Parliament.uk 2020). This is a prime
example, directly relevant to the concerns raised in the consensus statement, of the highest
levels of government silencing the clinical community.
8 Conclusion: Challenging Pathocentric Epistemic Complexes
Integrated care, where different professionsmust work together, provides an arena inwhichmultiple
forms of epistemic injustice play out.Many of these are caused by systems rather than by individuals
and our evaluation included some suggestions for challenging these. First, recognising the different
but equally valid forms of knowledge held by both KWs and TTs must form the basis of the joint
working relationship. Happily, our joint reflective meetings enabled the different disciplines to work
together on equal terms, so we asked for these to become a regularised event. Second, managers and
commissioners need to be able to acknowledge each other’s different positions and find ways to
accommodate these in a spirit ofmutual understanding, honesty and respect. Third, such initiatives –
which are designed to help people – must operate within a policy framework built on similarly
virtuous principles. This requires, in the first instance, government acknowledgement of the
evidence placed before it.
In Working Well, a pathocentric epistemic complex, governed by arbitrary ideological and/or
competitive influences and underpinned by a vicious policy, converged to produce new forms of
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epistemic injustice. This generated a tension in which clinical knowledge at the front line was
unfairly but unintentionally prioritised, yet NHS services lost out to local authority and private
providers at the commissioning level. While this contradiction might not be replicated in all
integrated contexts, the complexity of such systems makes it possible, damaging outcomes for
clients (adding to their existing problems) and reducing confidence in joint working. Given the
combination of injustices that arise at the intersection of mental health and welfare services, and the
increasing integration agenda in theUKand globally, this seems like a perfect storm.Yet, integration
remains one of themost promising avenues for public services. Drawing on learning from this study,
we therefore caution against creating environments in which damaging epistemic factors can work
against the overall goals of integrated programmes.
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